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We investigate the foreclosure policy of collateral-based loans in which the endogenous collateral value plays a 
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low when banks call in loans by auctioning off borrowers’ collateral and this makes clearing up non-performing 
loans less attractive.  We attribute the banks’ leniency as we have observed in Japan during the 1990s to an 
equilibrium arrangement where banks can commit due to either relationship banking or an implicit lender-
borrower contract, such as the arrangement under Japan’s main-bank system. 
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1 Introduction
Regulatory forbearance has been considered as one of the main suspects for financial
institutions to roll over non-performing loans and delay in clearing up bad loans, and thus
eventually responsible for the weakness of financial institutions and prolonged contractions
in real economic activity.1 The measures may include relaxing regulatory supervision,
outright government subsidies and bailout. For example, Cargill et al. (1997) argue that
Japan’s government has adopted “buy time” policies since the burst of its real estate
market and stock market booms, such as relaxing bank capital requirements, allowing
banks to hold non-performing loans without special write-oﬀs, and also allowing insolvent
financial institutions to operate, in the hope that the economy and the real-estate market
would soon recover, so as to float these financial institutions back to health.
In this paper we argue that the “forbearance” phenomenon needs not necessarily be
a consequence of anticipated government subsidy or bailout, rather, it can arise from an
equilibrium arrangement between financial institutions and their borrowers. This “private
forbearance” story is motivated Okina and Shiratsuka (2001) and Mori et al. (2001), who
documented that even though Japanese banks’ non-performing loans rose significantly
after stock and real estate prices crashed in the early 1990s, financial institutions continued
to lend to unprofitable firms in order to prevent loan losses from materializing, because
collateral was of little value to cover their losses. The empirical testing by Kobayashi
et al. (2002) also found evidence that Japanese banks exercised forbearance lending in
construction and real estate industries during 1993-1999.
We investigate the foreclosure policy of collateral-based loans in which the endogenous
collateral value plays a crucial role. Creditors may or may not be able to commit to the
1For example, Chang and Velasco (2001), McKinnon and Pill (1998) proclaim the potential
catastrophic consequence of the “overborrowing” syndrome and the boom-bust cycle of asset prices due
to the anticipation of government rescue. See also Krugman (1998) and Kim and Lee (2002) how govern-
ment guarantee causes large boom-bust fluctuations in asset prices and economic activity. For example,
Kim and Lee construct a dynamic model which stresses the relationship between collateralized asset and
government subsidy to firms. They assume that banks are willing to supply funds to money-losing firms
as long as the value of collateral still covers the amount of debt. A crisis erupts when the value of the
asset falls below the amount of cumulated loans.
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pre-specified foreclosure policy. With commitment the foreclosure policy may specify a
lower level of liquidation (or roll over all of the loans) relative to the ex post eﬃciency
criterion, which we dub as “forbearance lending.” When the world interest rate is lower,
the public is initially more optimistic about the prospects of project returns, firms hold
a higher level of collateralizable asset initially, or when creditors can better enforce re-
payments, the equilibrium arrangement with commitment tends to feature forbearance
lending. On the other hand, the model with no commitment always specifies a higher
level of liquidation than ex post eﬃciency requires. We attribute the observed leniency
of banks to their customers as the equilibrium arrangement when banks are able to pre-
commit due to either relationship banking or implicit lender-borrower contract, such as
the arrangement under Japan’s main-bank system.2
Our model is based on the building blocks of recent works that emphasize the inter-
action between the credit constraints and the value of collateralized assets.3 Structurally,
our model is closer to Holmstrom and Tirole (1998). They consider a three-period model
in which at the interim period a stochastic amount of liquidity is required to keep the
project going. Lenders will reconsider whether to supply the extra working capital based
on the realization of liquidity shock. If terminated, the liquidity value of the project is
zero. Investment is subject to moral hazard in that an entrepreneur can gain some private
benefit by privately choosing to shirk, which aﬀect the project’s probability of success.
They find that the optimal cutoﬀ is always between the ex post first-best cutoﬀ and the
other cutoﬀ of which lenders cannot pre-commit,4 there can be no leniency arising from
the second-best contract.
This paper is also related to the literature of soft budget constraint (SBC), in partic-
ular to those works that conceive SBC as a dynamic commitment problem, due to, for
2See, for example, Aoki and Dore (1994), Hoshi (2000), and Hoshi and Kashyap (1999).
3This literature, such as Kiyotaki and Moore (1997), Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997), and Chen (2001),
concentrates on the transmission mechanism of an exogenous shock which generates large fluctuations in
asset prices and persistent eﬀects on economic activity.
4The reason for the second-best cutoﬀ falls below the first-best cutoﬀ (i.e., more stringent liquidity
supply policy) is that since firms are credit-constrained and thus the rate of return of their internal fund
exceeds the market rate, they do not want to be full insured in order to exchange for more investment
ex ante.
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example, government subsidy and expected bailout, financial structure, and asymmetric
information.5 For example, a mainstream view of SBC is that failure to enforce bank-
ruptcy rule due to expectations of government bailout creates creditor passivity.6 Our
paper challenges the general view of soft budget constraint literature that failure to com-
mitment generally leads to leniency. We shows that creditors tend to liquidate more ex
post when they cannot commit ex ante, while they may roll over more loans with com-
mitment. Also the results do not rely on asymmetric information, government subsidy or
expected bailout.
Morris and Shin (2001) also investigate how creditors decide to roll over or terminate
loans, based on other creditors’ moves. They show that the coordination problem leads
to multiple equilibria when the state of the economy is common knowledge. On the other
hand, when private information is introduced, there is a unique equilibrium provided that
the private signal is suﬃciently precise and multiplicity of equilibrium re-emerges if the
private signal is not informative enough. In our paper there is no private information and
the equilibrium is unique. The key is that the value of collateral depends on the fraction
of loans to be liquidated and in their model the yields from foreclosure (liquidation value)
does not depend on the number of creditors who foreclose.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines the environment of
the model. Section 3 analyzes financial contracting when creditors are able to commit.
We discuss under what conditions forbearance lending arises. Section 4 contrasts the pre-
vious section by considering the equilibrium arrangement when creditors can not commit.
Section 5 concludes.
5See recent surveys by Mitchell (2000) and Maskin and Xu (2001). For applications of soft budget
constraint to dynamic commitment problems and banking sector problems, see also Berglof and Roland
(1997) and Huang and Xu (1999), and the references within.
6For example, Mitchell (1998) argues that banks choose to roll over bad loans if they expect government
bailout ex post. In turn, the government fails to commit not to rescue insolvent financial institutions if
there are too many of them.
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2 The Environment
Consider a small open economy with three groups of agents: creditors, entrepreneurs, and
landlords. There are three periods indexed by t = 0, 1, and 2. All agents are assumed to
be risk neutral and consume only at date-2. In each period there is a single consumption
good and also a durable asset. The durable asset is initially held by entrepreneurs and
landlords and its aggregate supply is assumed to be fixed at K. After production, the
asset becomes valueless at the end of date-2.
Each entrepreneur has access to a two-period investment project in which the durable
asset serves as the sole input:
y2 = eAk0,
where k0 is the level of the durable asset invested at date-0 and eA is random and represents
the project’s productivity. Assume that eA equals A with probability π and equals 0
with probability 1 − π, where A > 0. The realization of eA is publicly observable. An
aggregate shock π is drawn from the set (0, 1) according to the cumulative distribution
function G(•) with a density g(•). Conditioned on π, eA is independently and identically
distributed across borrowers. The distributionG(•) can be considered as the public’s prior
assessment of the prospects of the projects. We assume that projects are not reversible
but can be divisible at date-1. Assume that
E (π)A > r2, (1)
where E (π) =
R
πdG(π) and r is the world gross interest rate. This condition says
investing in projects is socially desirable given the initial assessment of the probability of
success.
At date-1 a public signal is revealed which is perfectly correlated with the realization
of the probability π at date-2. We will study how this interim information aﬀects lending,
investment, and date-1 loan foreclosure policy.
Each entrepreneur is endowed with a quantity of durable asset k−1. The date-0 the
budget constraint faced by each entrepreneur is
q0k0 = q0k−1 + b0, (2)
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where q0 is the date-0 price of the durable asset in terms of consumption goods and b0 is
the amount of borrowing at date-0. The determination of b0 will be explained below.
We assume that the investment technology is specific to each entrepreneur: if the
entrepreneur who has invested at date-0 abandons his project before date-2, the project
produces nothing and is left only with its liquidation value; and the entrepreneur is free
to walk away from the project. Foreseeing the possibility that entrepreneurs can threaten
to walk away from production at date-1, and also that the asset becomes valueless at the
end of date-2, creditors do not lend more than the date-1 expected value of the collateral:
b0 ≤
q1k0
r
, (3)
where q1 is the expected date-1 asset price.
7
The above borrowing constraint implicitly assumes that entrepreneurs can not divert
fixed asset for their own benefit after the initial investment has been in place. On the
other hand, we assume that an entrepreneur can divert a fraction (1− θ) of the date-2
project return, 0 < θ < 1. This says the entrepreneur can at most pledge a fraction θ
of total project returns to his creditor. Thus, when the banking sector is competitive
and the entrepreneur has strong bargaining power, the entrepreneur can reduce his debt
repayment down to a fraction θ of total project returns.8 This assumption can be justified
by the creditor’s limited capability to track down run-away borrowers.
Given the above assumptions, the financial contract specifies whether and the extent
to roll over loans based on the new information available at date-1. When foreclosure
is taken place, creditors seize a fraction or all of the assets and auction them oﬀ to the
landlords, causing the asset price to fall.
The role of landlords is to serve as a buﬀer absorbing the changes of entrepreneurs’
7See Hart and Moore (1994, 1998) and Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) for more details in the analysis of
renegotiation and debt repayment. Empirically, this is consistent with the literature of corporate finance,
stating that a weak contractual enforcement is closely associated with credit market constraint. See, for
example, La Porta et al. (1997), whereby weak enforcement of shareholder rights explains a great deal
of the variation in how firms are funded and owned across countries.
8See Holmstrom and Tirole (1998) for a somewhat diﬀerent derivation of the “pledgeable returns” to
creditors. It is the wedge between total project unit return and the entrepreneur’s pledgeable unit return
that results in a foreclosure rule deviating from the first-best cutoﬀ.
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demand for assets. They hold the rest of the asset k0 which is not employed by the
entrepreneurs. The per period rental rate of the asset for alternative uses is given by
ut ≡ H 0(k0t), (4)
where H(•) satisfies the usual neoclassical assumptions, H 0(x) > 0, H 00(x) < 0 for all x,
and H 0(0) =∞ and H 0(∞) = 0.
To close the model, we require the asset market clears at each period,
K = k0t + kt, t = 0, 1. (5)
Also, condition (6) governs the behavior of asset prices over time so that no arbitrage
opportunity is allowed:
q0 = H
0(k00) + q1/r. (6)
2. 1 Ex post eﬃciency
Note that at date-1 ex post eﬃciency requires a project to be stopped if the signal indicates
that the project’s expected return is smaller than or equal to the liquidation value per
unit of the investment,
πA/r ≤ q1 (π) ,
and continued if otherwise, where q1 (π) is date-1 equilibrium asset price given the obser-
vation of the signal. Note that q1 (π) = H
0(K − k1(π)), where k1(π) is date-1 investment
given π, then the condition can be restated as
πA/r ≤ H 0(K − k1(π)).
Suppose the signal indicates that πA/r > H 0(K − k1(π)), then it is optimal to continue
the project and thus k1(π) = k0. We denote the threshold value π such that there will be
no liquidation at all when π > π, where π satisfies πA/r = H 0(K − k0). Then we have
π =
rH 0(K − k0)
A
.
On the other hand, we denote π to be such that when π < π, the entire project should
be liquidated, where the cutoﬀ π satisfies πA/r = H 0(K), or
π =
rH 0(K)
A
< π.
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When π is between π and π, an equilibrium requires that πA/r = H 0(K−k1(π)). The
date-1 investment k1(π) can be solved accordingly, which is increasing in π. In Figure
1, the solid curve is the locus of date-1 asset price. The set of thresholds (π,π) can be
referred as the ex post eﬃciency cutoﬀs.
3 Commitment
The financial contract consists of date-0 investment and date-1 investment given π,
{k0, k1(π)}, and a foreclosure policy which specifies a set of threshold values of π. When
creditors are able to commit, the entrepreneur’s problem is to maximize his expected
returns, E [(1− θ)πAk1 (π)], subject to the borrower’s budget constraint and borrowing
constraint, (2) and (3), and the creditor’s participation constraint
E [πθAk1(π) + r(k0 − k1(π))q1(π)] ≥ r2b0,
and also the constraint 0 ≤ k1(π) ≤ k0. On the left-hand of the creditor’s participation
constraint, the first term is the expected project returns accrued to the creditor and
the other term is the revenue from liquidating the asset. The right-hand side is the
opportunity cost of the funds.
Substitute the budget constraint (2) into creditor’s participation constraint and the
borrowing constraint (3):
Max. E [(1− θ)πAk1 (π)] /r2,
s.t. E [πθAk1(π) + r(k0 − k1(π))q1(π)] /r2 ≥ q0 (k0 − k−1) , (7)
q0k−1 ≥ (q0 − q1/r) k0, (8)
k1(π) ≤ k0, for all π. (9)
0 ≤ k1(π), for all π. (10)
Let the Lagrangian multipliers of the four constraints be λ1, λ2, µ1 (π) and µ2 (π),
respectively.
Proposition 1 Suppose E (π) θA > rq1 for any q1. Then
(i) the financial contract features k1(π) = k0 for all π;
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(ii) the creditor’s participation constraint is slack; and
(iii) the entrepreneurs borrow up to the maximum limit of the borrowing constraint.
The first proposition shows that if the creditors’ ex-ante expected project return per
unit of investment is larger than the expected date-1 collateral value, then the financial
contract features no asset liquidation for any realization of π. This occurs when either
creditors can better enforce repayments, the public is initially more optimistic about the
economy’s outlook, or the project’s potential unit return is large.
In this case, entrepreneurs borrow up to the maximum limit of the borrowing constraint
so that the equilibrium investment is given by
k0 =
q0k−1
q0 − q1/r
,
which says that the quantity equals the entrepreneur’s net worth times an investment
multiplier which is the reciprocal of the amount of down payment per unit of investment.
We are, however, more interested in the case in which the data-1 investment k1(π)
may be lower than the initial investment k0 for some π. Suppose that E (π) θA ≤ rq1
and maxπ πθA > rq1 for some q1, then k1(π) cannot equal to k0 for all π. We can show
that there exist πc such that k1(π) = k0 for π ≥ πc, and k1(π) < k0 for π < πc. The
superscript is referred to as commitment. By the first order conditions, we have
Aπ [(1− θ) + λ1θ] /λ1r = q1(π) + rµ1 (π) /λ1 for π ≥ πc, (11)
Aπ [(1− θ) + λ1θ] /λ1r = q1(π)− rµ2 (π) /λ1 for π < πc. (12)
Note that for π ≥ πc, k1(π) equals k0 and the date-1 asset price remains at q1(π) =
H 0(K − k0). Using (11), the critical value πc is given by
πc =
rλ1H
0(K − k0)
A [(1− θ) + λ1θ]
.
Next, when k1(π) is strictly lower than k0, there are two sub-cases. The first case is
when k1(π) drops to zero. When k1(π) = 0, the date-1 asset price reaches its lowest level,
q1(π) = H
0(K), which no longer depends on π. Together with (12), the condition that
k1(π) drops to zero is when π is low enough,
π <
rλ1H
0(K)
A [(1− θ) + λ1θ]
≡ πc.
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Comparing with πc, it is immediate that πc < πc. Note that πc and πc are both increasing
in λ1 and both drop to zero as λ1 approaches zero. The second case is when k1(π) is strictly
positive but smaller than k0, which arises when π
c < π < πc. By (12), the date-1 asset
price is
q1(π) =
πA [(1− θ) + λ1θ]
rλ1
, for πc < π < πc. (13)
Note that q1(π) is increasing in π and decreasing in λ1. Since q1(π) = H
0(K− k1(π)), the
date-1 investment k1(π) is implied by
H 0(K − k1(π)) =
πA
rλ1
[(1− θ) + λ1θ] . (14)
It is straightforward to show that k1(π) is also increasing in π and decreasing in λ1.
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To solve for the endogenous variables, plugging πc, πc, (8), (13), and (14) into the
creditor’s participation constraint (7),
E (π | π ≥ πc) θAk0 + rk0G(πc)H 0(K) +
E [πθAk1(π) + r(k0 − k1(π))q1(π) | πc < π < πc] = r2q0 (k0 − k−1) ,
then we can solve for the multiplier λ1 as a function of date-0 asset price and investment,
λ1 = λ1 (q0, k0). Next, using (13), we can express the expected date-1 asset price as
q1 = [1−G(πc)]H 0(K − k0) +E [π | πc < π < πc] A [(1− θ) + λ1θ]
λ1r
+G(πc)H 0(K).
Together with the cutoﬀs πc and πc, we can solve for q1 = q1 (k0,λ1 (q0, k0)). Finally,
using (6) and (8), we can solve for q0 and k0 in terms of model parameters, θ, r, k−1, K,
and H 0. Substituting them back to λ1, πc and πc, all endogenous variables are solved.
Proposition 2 summarizes the above results.
Proposition 2 Suppose E (π) θA ≤ rq1, maxπ πθA > rq1 for some q1, then
(i) the creditor’s participation constraint binds;
(ii) the financial contract features k1(π) < k0 for some π. There exist a set thresholds
(πc,πc) such that k1(π) = k0 for π ≥ πc, 0 < k1(π) < k0 for πc < π < πc, and
k1(π) = 0 for π < π
c.
9The sign of the second derviative w.r.t. π is less obvious, d
2k1(π)
dπ2 =
A[(1−θ)+λ1θ]
rλ1H000(K−k1(π))
dk1(π)
dπ , which
depends on the curvature of the function H (·).
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Figure 2a illustrates the equilibrium foreclosure policy when λ1 ∈ (λ, 1). The line
Aπ [(1− θ) + λ1θ] /rλ1 is strictly increasing in π, while the dotted curve is the path
of date-1 asset price q1(π) which is non-decreasing in π and bounded by H
0(K) and
H 0(K − k0). By (11) and (12), we have Aπ [(1− θ) + λ1θ] /rλ1 > q1(π) if π > πc, and
Aπ [(1− θ) + λ1θ] /rλ1 < q1(π) if π < πc, where Aπ [(1− θ) + λ1θ] /rλ1 is the expected
return of the project, weighted by the multiplier λ1. In the region π
c < π < πc, the
weighted expected return of the project must be equal to the equilibrium liquidation
value of collateral, and thus any realization of π in this region yields a partial liquidation,
0 < k1(π) < k0.
The dotted line in Figure 2b depicts k1(π) for each realization of π. The date-1
investment remains at k0 as long as π > π
c, starts to decline monotonically when π falls
below πc, and drops to zero when π ≤ πc.
3. 1 De fining fo rb earance lending
We say that forbearance lending arises when the equilibrium contract specifies a lower
level of liquidation for a given realization of the signal, compared with the foreclosure
policy under ex post eﬃciency.
Proposition 3 (i) If λ1 > λ, then π < π < π
c < πc, and
(ii) if 0 < λ1 < λ, then π
c < πc < π < π.,
where λ ≡ (1−θ)H0(K)
H0(K−k0)−θH0(K)
< 1 < H
0(K−k0)
H0(K) ≡ λ.
To understand Proposition 3, first starts with the case λ1 = 1. Then the weighted
expected return of the project, Aπ [(1− θ) + λ1θ] /rλ1, reduces to Aπ/r, which coincides
with expected return of the project under ex post eﬃciency criterion. Thus, πc = π and
πc = π. When λ1 decreases, say, λ1 ∈ (λ, 1), then we have πc < π < πc < π. This is
depicted in Figure 2a. The dotted line is the locus of date-1 asset price with commitment,
while the solid line is that of asset price under ex post eﬃciency criterion. There is an
overlapping range between the two sets of cutoﬀs, but the former curve is everywhere
higher than the latter, except on the upper and lower boundaries. This corresponds to
the date-1 investments in Figure 2b: the quantity of liquidation under commitment is
11
everywhere smaller than that under ex post eﬃciency except on the boundaries, suggesting
a tendency of forbearance lending.
The intuition behind this is that λ1 corresponds to the shadow price of ex ante expected
net rate of return of creditors’ net worth. When λ1 drops to zero, the creditor’s break-
even condition is slack and thus the equilibrium contract favors entirely the entrepreneur’s
objective, as we have seen in Proposition 1. When λ1 is strictly positive, a lower λ1 means
that the creditor’s break-even condition is less binding, thus the weighted expected return
of the project gives more weight to the entrepreneur’s expected return. This in turn lowers
the cutoﬀs that trigger liquidation. By (13) and (14), it is clear that dq1(π)/dλ1 < 0 and
dk1(π)/dλ1 < 0 for π
c < π < πc. This says when creditors’s break-even condition is less
binding, date-1 investment and asset price will be higher, echoing the fact that the cutoﬀs
(πc,πc) are lower.
The result also can be understood from Figure 2b directly. To see this, suppose we
consider the case that the realized signal happens to be π = π. Then, the equilibrium
arrangement with commitment requires liquidation down to the point C, while the ex post
eﬃciency requires to liquidate all assets (see point D). Suppose now creditors continue
to liquidate more, the date-1 asset price will be pushed further downward from point A
to B in Figure 2a. Then the date-1 asset price falls below the weighted expected rate of
return of the project, q1(π) < Aπ [(1− θ) + λ1θ] /rλ1. But this cannot be an equilibrium.
In other words, since liquidation depresses the collateral value, the equilibrium requires
that liquidation stops at the point when it is not worth selling an additional unit of the
asset.
When λ1 is even smaller, that is λ1 < λ, as depicted in Figure 3a, forbearance lending
is particularly acute. For example, when the signal indicates that πc < π < π, the
project should be completely terminated from the viewpoint of ex post eﬃciency, but will
be entirely rolled over when lenders can commit. In contrast, when λ1 is large enough,
say, λ1 > λ, as shown in Figure 3b, the foreclosure policy is completely opposite to the
previous case. A moderately poor signal may trigger liquidation under commitment, even
when ex post eﬃciency suggests continuation. This is because now the weighted expected
return of the project gives more weight to the creditor’s expected return, and thus the
foreclosure rule will lean towards the creditor’s interest.
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Despite the simplicity of the model, it is not possible to assess the impacts of exogenous
variables implicitly, because both thresholds (πc,πc) contain endogenous variables. We
therefore use a numerical example to investigate the model’s properties of comparative
statics. Given a uniform distribution of π and a reasonable concave function for H(·), we
demonstrate that λ1 becomes monotonically is increasing in r, and decreasing in k−1, θ, A,
and a first-order stochastic dominance (FSD) shift in the distribution in π. Furthermore,
date-0 investment k0 and asset price q0 are both increasing in r, k−1, θ, A, and a first-order
stochastic dominance (FSD) shift in the distribution in π.
Therefore, when the world interest rate is lower, the entrepreneurs hold more collateral,
creditors can better enforce repayments, or the public is initially more optimistic about
the economy’s outlook, the expected external finance premium λ1 becomes lower and
entrepreneurs are able to borrow more, and at the same time this also bid up the asset
price. The pair of thresholds (πc,πc) with commitment tend to become lower relative
to the pair (π,π) , so that forbearance lending emerges as an equilibrium arrangement.
Therefore, the realization of a low π may result in only partial liquidation or even rollover
of entire loans.
The result that forbearance lending emerges as an equilibrium arrangement corre-
sponds to the observed leniency of creditors to their customers as we have observed in
Japan during the 1990s. Recall that in the second half of 1980s, rapidly soaring land price
raised the value corporations’ collateral and rendered them to acquire more collateral and
borrow more for investment. Growth rates were higher and optimism abounded. Together
with Japan’s main-bank system in which relationship banking or implicit lender-borrower
contract is an essential feature, this creates a fertile ground for forbearance lending. Note
also that we do not have to resort to the expected government subsidy or rescue to gen-
erate this seemingly “soft budget constraint” (SBC) phenomenon.
4 No Commitment
For the equilibrium characterized above to be viable, there must be some commitment
technology by which creditors are obligated to the pre-specified foreclosure policy. Suppose
creditors cannot commit to the above foreclosure policy, then creditors decide whether
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and to what extent loans are to be rolled over after observing the date-1 signal. We
need to solve the equilibrium backwards: creditors set their date-1 foreclosure rule given
the signal and entrepreneurs’ date-0 investment decisions, and then the financial contract
determines the amount of date-0 loans and investment.
4.1 Banks’ date-1 decision rules
We first consider the date-1 ex post decision of creditors given the observation of π and
entrepreneurs’ date-0 borrowing and investment decisions. Given the signal, if the given
amount of loan k0 is rolled over, then the creditor receives an expected value of θπAk0 at
date-2. On the other hand, if a certain fraction or all of loan is recalled, then the creditor
receives q1(π) for each unit of asset liquidated and an expected return θπA for each unit of
the remaining investment. This yields an expected return rq1(π)(k0− k1(π))+ θπAk1(π).
Comparing these two alternatives, liquidation is better oﬀ than no-liquidation if
(θπA− rq1(π)) (k0 − k1(π)) ≤ 0.
Since in this case k0 > k1(π), we must have θπA ≤ rq1(π). Thus, from the creditors’ ex
post point of view, the foreclosure policy is specified as follows: roll over (k1(π) = k0)
if q1(π) < θπA/r, and liquidate (k1(π) < k0) if q1(π) ≥ θπA/r. The latter condition
says that if the date-1 equilibrium asset price is greater than or equal to the present
value of per unit debt repayment to creditors, then creditors are better oﬀ to liquidate
the assets. The liquidation will not stop until the condition holds with equality.Since
q1(π) = H
0(K − k1(π)), we have θπA/r ≤ H 0(K − k1(π)).
We define the cutoﬀ πn to be such that when π > πn, the loan is rolled over and thus
k1(π) equals to k0, then
πn =
rH 0(K − k0)
θA
.
When π < πn, the creditor will start to liquidate loans. The superscript is referred to as
no-commitment. We also define πn such that when π < πn, k1(π) is equal to zero,
πn =
rH 0(K)
θA
< πn.
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Thus, when the realized π locates inside the range (πn,πn), the date-1 investment is
implied by
H 0(K − k1 (π)) = θπA/r.
4.2 Date-0 borrowing and investment d ecision
At date-0, given the date-1 liquidation policy (πn,πn), the entrepreneur maximizes the
objective,
(1− θ)A
(
k0
Z 1
πn
πdG+
Z πn
πn
πk1 (π) dG
)
/r2,
subjective to the creditor’s participation constraint,
s.t. θAk0
Z 1
πn
πdG+ rk0H
0(K)G (πn) +Z πn
πn
[πθAk1(π) + r(k0 − k1(π))q1(π)] dG ≥ r2q0 (k0 − k−1) , (15)
the budget constraint (2), and the borrowing constraint (3).
Note that in the objective function the eﬀect of a change in k0 on πn is given by
(1− θ)A [k0 (−πn) + πnk1 (πn)] /r2
dπn
dk0
.
Since k1 (π
n) = k0, the eﬀect of a change in k0 on πn is cancelled out. Furthermore, since
the date-1 investment is implied by H 0(K − k1(π)) = θπA/r for π < πn, we can rewrite
the objective function as
Max. (1− θ)A
(
k0
Z 1
πn
πdG+
Z πn
πn
π
h
K − (H 0)−1 (θπA/r)
i
dG
)
/r2,
which is an increasing and linear function of k0. Therefore, it is easy to see that in
equilibrium the creditors’ participation constraint and borrowing constraint are binding.
For πn < π < πn the date-1 asset price is given by q1(π) = πθA/r, substituting into
the creditors’ participation constraint yields
r2q0k−1 =
"
r2q0 − θA
Z 1
πn
πdG− rH 0(K)G (πn)
#
k0,
where πn = rH 0(K)/θA. After some manipulation, we can solve for the date-0 investment
k0 by
k0 − k−1
k−1
r2H 0(K − k0) = θA
Z 1
πn
πdG+ rH 0(K)G (πn) . (16)
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Together with borrowing constraint q0k−1 = (q0 − q1/r) k0 and condition (6), these three
equations solve for the three endogenous variables, denoted (kn0 , q
n
0 , q
n
1 ).
The dotted line in Figure 4a illustrates the locus of date-1 asset price under no com-
mitment qn1 (π). The date-1 asset price under ex post eﬃciency always lie above q
n
1 (π).
It can be immediately observed that
π ≡ rH
0(K)
A
<
rH 0(K)
θA
≡ πn,π ≡ rH
0(K)
A
<
rH 0(K − k0)
θA
≡ πn.
Therefore, the quantity of liquidation under no-commitment is always larger than that
under ex post eﬃciency foreclosure policy. The intuition why the cutoﬀs with no com-
mitment (πn,πn) diﬀers from the ex post eﬃciency cutoﬀs (π,π) is that there is a wedge
between the project’s expected return (πA) and the pledgeable expected return to lenders
(θπA). An entrepreneur can at most pledge to the lender θπA per unit of investment,
due to imperfect enforceability, thus lenders tends to liquidate more than the quantity
required by ex post eﬃciency if they can review their foreclosure policy ex post.
From Figure 4, it can be immediately observed that the result of foreclosure policy
with no commitment resembles the case with commitment when λ1 is large, where there
is no forbearance lending. Thus, the observation of no-forbearance-lending may be either
due to the fact that creditors are not able to pre-commit and simply follows the wait-
and-see policy, or that even with commitment the economy’s fundamentals or prospects
deteriorate and thus creditors abandon forbearance lending policy.
We conduct some comparative statics analysis. First, to see the eﬀect of a change
in θ, note that the direct eﬀect of a better enforceability lowers the cutoﬀ πn, while the
indirect eﬀect encourages lenders to lend more given the same level of collateral, raising
both the date-0 investment and asset price (dkn0 /θ > 0, dq
n
0 /θ > 0), and π
n. Which eﬀect
dominates depends on model parameters. A change in θ also aﬀect π. We then have
dπ/θ > |dπn/θ| > 0, that is, πn is less sensitive to a change in θ than π is. An increase in
productivity A has a similar eﬀect on πn and π, and again πn is less sensitive to changes
in A.
Second, a higher entrepreneur’ initial holding of collateral k−1 increases investment
and asset price (dkn0 /k−1 > 0, dq
n
0 /k−1 > 0), and at the same time raises π
n, which says
the initial booms in the credit market and asset market make it vulnerable to bad news.
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Finally, a first-order stochastic dominance (FSD) shift in the distribution of π indicates
that initially the public has a more optimistic assessment about the prospects of project
returns, which raises both date-0 investment and asset price but also pushes πn to a higher
level, making it more likely to start liquidating assets. The eﬀect of a FSD shift to π is
similar and again less than that to πn.
Note that an shift in k−1 or FSD also raises π. The eﬀects of a shift in k−1 or FSD are
presented in Figure 5. Either shift raises the initial investment kn0 to a higher level. Since
the line θπA/r is flatter than the line πA/r, the threshold πn under no commitment rises
to a larger extent than the ex post eﬃciency threshold π does. Note that the results of
comparative statics analysis regarding to changes in k−1, θ, and FSD to date-0 investment
and asset price are the same as the numerical analysis in section 3 where creditors are
able to commit. Proposition 4 summarizes the above results.
Proposition 4 Given the no-commitment equilibrium,
(1) The creditors always liquidate more under no-commitment than they do under
ex post eﬃciency foreclosure policy, except on the boundaries;
(2) A better enforceability or productivity (higher θ or A) raises both the date-0
investment and asset price and lowers πn and π, while the eﬀect to πn and πis am-
biguous;
(3) A higher entrepreneur’ initial holding of collateral k−1 or a shift in the distribu-
tion of π in the sense of FSD increases the date-0 investment and asset price, and
also raises the cutoﬀs πn and π. Also the threshold πn rises more than π does.
5 Discussions and Concluding Remarks
In this paper we show that, as an alternative view to the government’s regulatory for-
bearance, private forbearance can emerge as an equilibrium result with commit when the
world interest rate is lower, the entrepreneurs hold more collateral, creditors can better
enforce repayments, or the public is initially more optimistic about the economy’s out-
look. The key to this result is that the endogenous collateral value acts as a safe valve to
prevent creditors from liquidating too much.
17
This explains why creditors sometimes roll over loans even when the returns seem not
so promising, without resorting to expected government subsidy or bailout. Our model
thus provides an alternative aspect of problems of a bank-based financial system in which
loan-making is determined by collateralizable asset’s value.
Thus, we may empirically observe that the amount of loans supplied by creditors
exhibits a negative correlation with firms’ financial stance and collateral value, which
may seem counter-intuitive if forbearance lending is not taken into account. Thus, we can
test the hypothesis of existence of forbearance lending by controlling for the government’s
behavior.
18
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Proof of Proposition 1 and 2
The second-best financial contract solves the following problem, denoted as (P1)
Max. Eπ [(1− θ)πAk1 (π)] /r2,
s.t. Eπ [πθAk1(π) + r(k0 − k1(π))q1(π)] /r2 ≥ b0,
q0k0 = q0k−1 + b0,
b0 ≤
q1k0
r
,
0 ≤ k1(π) ≤ k0.
Substitute the budget constraint (2) into creditor’s participation constraint (7) and
the borrowing constraint (3):
Max. Eπ [(1− θ)πAk1 (π)] /r2,
s.t. Eπ [πθAk1(π) + r(k0 − k1(π))q1(π)] /r2 ≥ q0 (k0 − k−1) ,
q0k−1 ≥ (q0 − q1/r) k0,
k1(π) ≤ k0, for all π,
0 ≤ k1(π), for all π.
L = Eπ [(1− θ)πAk1 (π)] /r2 + λ1
n
Eπ [πθAk1(π) + r(k0 − k1(π))q1(π)] /r2 − q0 (k0 − k−1)
o
+
λ2 [q0k−1 − (q0 − q1/r) k0] +Eπ [µ1 (π) (k0 − k1(π))] +Eπ [µ2 (π) k1(π)] .
The first order conditions are
− (q0 − q1/r)λ1 − (q0 − q1/r)λ2 +Eπ [µ1 (π)] = 0, (17)
(1− θ)πA/r2 + λ1 [πθA− rq1(π)] /r2 − µ1 (π) + µ2 (π) = 0, (18)
λ1
n
Eπ [πθAk1(π) + r(k0 − k1(π))q1(π)] /r2 − q0 (k0 − k−1)
o
= 0, (19)
λ2 [q0k−1 − (q0 − q1/r) k0] = 0, (20)
µ1 (π) (k0 − k1(π)) = 0, (21)
µ2 (π) k1(π) = 0. (22)
A.1 Suppose λ1 = 0.
By (18), (1 − θ)πA/r2 − µ1 (π) + µ2 (π) = 0 for all π. This means µ1 (π) > 0 for
all π. Thus, k1(π) = k0 and µ2 (π) = 0 for all π. Note that µ1 (π) = (1 − θ)πA/r2.
The multiplier µ1 (π) is the ex post expected rate of return to entrepreneurs per unit of
investment at date-1. By (17),
λ2 =
E (π) (1− θ)A
(q0 − q1/r) r2
.
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Thus, by (20), the investment equals
k0 =
q0k−1
q0 − q1/r
.
By the creditor’s participation constraint (7), k1(π) equals k0 for all π requires that
E (π) θAk0 > r
2q0 (k0 − k−1) . Plugging in k0, the condition requires
E (π) θA/r > q1,
for any q1, so that creditors are willing to participate.
A.2 Suppose λ1 > 0.
Then, there exist πc such that k1(π) = k0 for π ≥ πc, and k1(π) < k0 for π < πc,
where by (18),
(1− θ)πA/r2 + λ1 [πθA− rq1(π)] /r2 − µ1 (π) = 0
for π ≥ πc, with µ1 (π) > 0, µ2 (π) = 0,(23)
(1− θ)πA/r2 + λ1 [πθA− rq1(π)] /r2 + µ2 (π) = 0
for π < πc with µ1 (π) = 0, µ2 (π) ≥ 0.(24)
A.2.1 If π ≥ πc, then k1(π) = k0.
By (23), the date-1 asset price is given by
q1(π) =
πθA
r
+
(1− θ)πA− r2µ1 (π)
rλ1
.
In this case, since q1(π) = H
0(K − k0) is a independent of π, the multiplier µ1 (π) can be
written as
µ1 (π) =
πA [(1− θ) + λ1θ]
r2
− λ1H
0(K − k0)
r
.
Note that µ1 (π) is continuous in π. For π ≥ πc, µ1 (π) > 0 and dµ1 (π) /dπ > 0; for
π < πc, µ1 (π) = 0. Thus, the cutoﬀ πc is defined such that k1(π) = k0 for π ≥ πc, and
k1(π) < k0 for π < π
c, and is given by
πc =
λ1rH
0(K − k0)
A [(1− θ) + λ1θ]
.
A.2.2 If π < πc, then k1(π) < k0., and also that
(1− θ)πA/r2 + λ1 [πθA− rq1(π)] /r2 + µ2 (π) = 0
if k1(π) = 0 (µ2 (π) > 0) , and (25)
(1− θ)πA+ λ1 [πθA− rq1(π)] = 0
if k1(π) > 0 (µ2 (π) = 0) . (26)
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(i) If µ2 (π) = 0, then k1(π) > 0. By (26), the date-1 asset price q1(π) is implied
by
q1(π) =
πθA
r
+
π(1− θ)A
λ1r
>
πθA
r
, (27)
which is increasing in π, and thus the quantity of k1(π) is implied by
πA [(1− θ) + λ1θ] = λ1rH 0(K − k1(π)). (28)
Note that k1(π) is also increasing in π.
(ii) If µ2 (π) > 0, then k1(π) = 0. By (25), the date-1 asset price now becomes
q1(π) =
πθA
r
+
π(1− θ)A+ r2µ2 (π)
λ1r
.
When k1(π) = 0, the asset price drops to the lowest level, q1(π) = H
0(K), which is a
independent of π. The multiplier µ2 (π) can be written as
µ2 (π) =
λ1H
0(K)
r
− πA [(1− θ) + λ1θ]
r2
.
Note that µ2 (π) > 0 and
dµ2(π)
dπ < 0 for k1(π) = 0, and µ2 (π) = 0 for k1(π) > 0. Thus,
the cutoﬀ πc is defined such that k1(π) = 0 for π < πc, and k1(π) > 0 for π ≥ πc, and is
given by
πc =
λ1rH
0(K)
A [(1− θ) + λ1θ]
.
Proof of Proposition 3
(1)π − πc = rH
0(K)
A
− rλ1H
0(K)
A [(1− θ) + λ1θ]
=
rH 0(K)
A
"
(1− θ) (1− λ1)
1− θ + λ1θ
#
>
< 0, if λ1
<
> 1.
(2)π − πc = rH
0(K − k0)
A
− rλ1H
0(K − k0)
A [(1− θ) + λ1θ]
=
rH 0(K − k0)
A
"
(1− θ) (1− λ1)
1− θ + λ1θ
#
>
< 0, if λ1
<
> 1.
(3)π − πc = rH
0(K)
A
− rλ1H
0(K − k0)
A [(1− θ) + λ1θ]
>
< 0, if λ1
<
> λ.
(4)πc − π = rλ1H
0(K)
A [(1− θ) + λ1θ]
− rH
0(K − k0)
A
>
< 0, if λ1
<
> λ.
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where 0 < λ ≡ (1−θ)H0(K)
H0(K−k0)−θH0(K)
< 1, and λ ≡ H0(K−k0)
H0(K) > 1.
If λ1 is large enough to be greater than λ, according to the above conditions, then we
have π < π < πc < πc. On the other hand, when λ1 is small such that 0 < λ1 < λ, then
we have πc < πc < π < π.
Proof of Proposition 4
(1) θ and A: An increase in θ lowers πn, while the eﬀect of a higher θ to πn is
ambiguous. To see this, note that a higher θ lowers πn, and thus decreases G (πn) and
raises
R 1
πn πdG. Furthermore, in the right-hand-side of (16) the increase in the first term
θA
R 1
πn πdG compensates more than the decrease in the second term rH
0(K)G (πn) , be-
cause θAπ ≥ rH 0(K) for π ≥ πn. Thus, the date-0 investment and asset price are both
increasing in θ (dkn0 /θ > 0, dq
n
0 /θ > 0). Therefore, the net eﬀect to π
n is
dπn
dθ
= −rH
0(K − kn0 )
θ2A
− rH
00(K − kn0 )
θ2A
dkn0
dθ
,
where the first term lowers the cutoﬀ because lenders now have better enforceability and
the second term raises the cutoﬀ due to the fact that higher initial investment and asset
price are more sensitive to the realization of π. The net eﬀect depends on the distribution
of π and the functional form of H 0(·), as well as parameters. An increase in productivity
A has a similar eﬀect.
(2) k−1: It is easy to see from (16) that higher entrepreneur’ initial holding of collateral
k−1 increases investment and asset price (dk
n
0 /k−1 > 0, dq
n
0 /k−1 > 0), and at the same
time raises πn, which says the initial booms in the credit market and asset market make
it vulnerable to bad news.
(3) FSD: A shift in the distribution of π in the sense of first-order stochastic domi-
nance (FSD) pushes πn to a higher level. To see this, observe that if the distribution of
π shifts upward in the sense of FSD, G (πn) is lower and
R 1
πn πdG is larger, and thus the
increase in θA
R 1
πn πdG is larger than the decline in rH
0(K)G (πn), and by the fact that
θAπ ≥ rH 0(K) for π ≥ πn. This raises RHS of (16) and thus increases date-0 investment
and asset price. This, in turn, raises πn.
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